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Introduction 
One of the top priorities of the international community during the last years, post-September 2001, 
has been to win the war against terrorism, and it is for this purpose that various international 
organisations and bodies have developed a comprehensive anti-terrorism strategy consisting of 
multiple components. One such component is the global effort to stop terrorist financing, which is 
intended to identify, disrupt and dismantle the financial networks of terrorist organisations. In this 
respect, what remains obvious is that at present terrorist financing has still been taking advantage 
of: (1) weaknesses in national regulatory schemes; (2) the informal transfer and movements of 
assets across national boundaries; (3) the disparity of corporate laws from one national system to 
another, which opens the possibility of using corporate vehicles in different States to conceal both 
the source and the beneficial final owner; and (4) several unregulated professional categories. For 
all these reasons it is of the utmost importance to look at where the failures lie in the strategy of 
Combating the Financing of Terrorism (CFT). 
 
This paper’s aim is to emphasise the challenges faced by international cooperation in combating the 
financing of terrorism. It reviews the existing weaknesses and failures of each group of stakeholders 
participating in the CFT strategy: (1) the lack of coordination between international organisations 
and the huge burden of legislations created; (2) the limitations of the institutional framework that 
hamper the implementation of international standards at a national level; and (3) the high ongoing 
costs of implementing the risk approach for private non-state actors (financial and non-financial 
institutions). Finally, the paper concludes by pointing out which challenges must be confronted and 
which actions should be taken for enhancing international cooperation. 
 
Weaknesses at the International Level: Lack of Coordination Between International 
Organisations and the huge burden of legislations created 
This first section reviews the role in the fight against the financing of terrorism of the main 
international organisations and institutions involved in the CFT strategy: the United Nations, the 
Financial Action Task Force, the transgovernmental Financial Regulatory Organisations and the 
Egmond Group of Financial Intelligence Units. 
 
The United Nations 
Terrorism is regarded by the United Nations (UN) as a pervasive and pernicious threat to global 
security and order, for which reason it has become one of the key international entities in 
addressing a wide variety of complex problems of a global character such as terrorism. The UN has 
the broadest range of membership as well as the ability to adopt treaties or international 
conventions that have the effect of law in a country once they are signed and ratified, depending on 
the country’s constitution. The UN was the first international organisation to undertake significant 
action to fight money laundering (ML) on a ‘truly world-wide basis’,2 and operates the Global 
Programme against Money Laundering (GPML).3 
 
Since the mid-1980s the need for a modern anti-money-laundering strategy has become widely 
                                                 
1 The views expressed in this publication are the author’s personal views and do not reflect the views or policies of the 
IMF. 
2 There are currently 191 member states of the UN from around the world. See List of Members, 
www.un.org/overview/unmember.html. 
3 See http://www. imoling.org/imoling/gpml.html. 
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accepted internationally. Progress in this area has actually become a critical tool in fighting 
organised crime, corruption and the financing of terrorism and in maintaining the integrity of the 
financial markets. The contribution of the UN to the harmonisation of actions taken against ML and 
FT is explored below. The first UN action was the 1988 United Nations Convention against Illicit 
Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (the Vienna Convention).4 This Convention 
was the first appeal to countries to deal with provisions to fight the illicit drug trade and with related 
law enforcement issues. The Convention is limited to drug trafficking as a predicate offence and 
does not address preventive aspects. Although it does not use the phrase ML, it does define the 
concept, which has become the most widely accepted one. The Convention came into force on 11 
November 1990. 
 
In line with the role of the Vienna Convention, Savona (1997) and Koh (2006) state: ‘The 
Ratification of the Vienna Convention is becoming virtually an indicator of responsible 
membership in the anti-drug and anti-Money Laundering world community’ (Savona, 1997, p. 68). 
‘In the international arena, the 1988 Vienna Convention for the first time established Money 
Laundering as “an independent criminal offence” although it confined its application only to drug-
related proceeds’ (Koh, 2006, p. 43). 
 
Before the Convention dealing with organised crime, in awareness of the global problem posed by 
terrorism, the UN’s 1999 International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of 
Terrorism5 was adopted on the assumption that ‘the financing of terrorism is a matter of grave 
concern to the international community and that the number and seriousness of acts of international 
terrorism depend on the financing that terrorists may obtain’ (Radicati & Megliani, 2004, p. 378). 
The Convention requires ratifying countries to criminalise terrorism, terrorist organisations, and 
terrorist acts. Under the Convention, it is unlawful for any person to provide or collect funds with 
the intent that these funds be used, or the knowledge that the funds will be used, for terrorist 
activities. The Convention encourages States to implement measures that are consistent with the 
FATF and came into force in 2002. 
 
The Convention6 enhanced the cooperation between States in adopting effective measures while not 
being able to agree on a specific definition of FT. It called State parties to adopt domestic measures 
for the purposes of identifying, detecting, freezing or seizing funds used for (defined) terrorist 
offences, and to ensure that financial institutions within their territories adopted efficient measures 
for the identification of clients and suspicious transactions. It recommended States to prohibit the 
opening of accounts by unidentified holders and to ask for the licensing of all money transmission 
agencies. 
 
One year later, the UN, in its strategy to undermine and disrupt organised crime groups by focusing 
on their finances, adopted another universal instrument, namely the 2000 International Convention 
Against Transnational Organized Crime (the Palermo Convention).7 The approach of this 
convention is well illustrated in Articles 7 (1)(a) and 7 (3): 
 
Article 7(1a) shall institute a comprehensive domestic regulatory and supervisory Regime from 
banks and non-bank financial institutions and, where appropriate, other bodies particularly 
susceptible to money-laundering, within its competence, in order to deter and detect all forms of 
                                                 
4 See http:// www.incb.org/e/conv/1988, as of December 2005. See http://www.unodc.org/unodc/treaty_adherence.html 
and The Vienna Convention Article 3(b) and (c). 
5 http://www.un.org/law/cod/finterr.htm and UN (2006), ‘Ratification, Accession, Succession or Signature of the 
Universal Instruments related to the Prevention and Suppression of International Terrorism, by date’, UN, New York, p. 
1-2. 
6 International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, United Nations General Assemble 
Resolution 54/109 of 9/XII/1999. 
7 http:// www.undcp.org/adhoc/palermo/convmain.html and W.C. Gilmore (2004), ‘Dirty Money: The Evolution of 
International Measures to Counter Money Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism’, Council of Europe, Strasbourg. 
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money-laundering, which Regime shall emphasize the requirements for customer identification, 
record-keeping and the reporting of suspicious transactions. 
Article 7 (3) then calls upon participating countries ‘to use a guideline’ as remarked again by 
Gilmore; the referred guideline is FATF standards. 
 
The Palermo Convention came into force in September 2003, compelling ratifying countries to 
criminalise ML via domestic law and to consider all serious crimes as ML predicate offences, 
whether committed within or without the country, as well as to permit the required criminal 
knowledge or intent to be inferred from objective facts.8Two further criteria for application amount 
to the most important contribution of the UN Convention against Transnational Organised Crime. 
First, the offence may be committed by ‘an organised criminal group’ and secondly, the offence 
may be ‘transnational in nature’. 
 
Furthermore, the Palermo Convention establishes regulatory regimes to deter and detect all forms of 
ML, including customer identification, recordkeeping and reporting of suspicious transactions; 
authorises the cooperation and exchange of information among administrative, regulatory, law 
enforcement and other authorities, both domestically and internationally; considers the 
establishment of a financial unit to collect, analyse and disseminate information; and promote 
international cooperation.9 
 
In keeping with international events, the Security Council adopted two resolutions on 15 October 
1999 and 16 January 2002, respectively: SC Resolutions 1267 and 1390. These resolutions compel 
member States to freeze assets of individuals and entities associated with Osama Bin Ladin or 
members of al-Qaeda or the Taliban that are included in the consolidated list maintained and 
regularly updated by the UN 1267 Sanctions Committee. 
 
Subsequently, a SC Resolution passed in response to a threat to International Peace and Security 
under Chapter VII of the UN.10 SC Resolution 137311 was adopted on 28 September 2001 in direct 
response to the events of 11 September 2001. It compels countries to criminalise actions financing 
terrorism and to deny all forms of support for it; freeze funds or assets of persons, organisations or 
entities involved in terrorist acts; prohibit active or passive assistance to terrorists; and cooperate 
with other countries in criminal investigations and sharing information about planned terrorist acts. 
 
Aware of the difficulties countries encounter when implementing such various legal instruments in 
their legislations, the UN created the Global Program Against Money Laundering (GPML). GPML 
is a research and assistance project offering technical expertise, training and advice to member 
countries on AML/CFT upon request in order to raise awareness. It helps to create legal frameworks 
with the support of model legislation; develop institutional capacity in particular with the creation of 
financial intelligence units; provide training for policymakers, judicial authorities, law enforcement 
bodies, regulator agencies and private financial sectors, including computer-base training; promote a 
regional approach to addressing problems; maintain strategic relationships and databases; and 
perform analyses of relevant information.12 
 
Also, the need to harmonise national legislations, more specifically in the case of CFT, drove the 
UN to create the United Nations Model Terrorist Financing Hill, 2003. This model law has been 
developed by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) for use in countries whose 
                                                 
8 The Palermo Convention, article 6. 
9 Id., 7 (1) (a). 
10 http://www.un.org. 
11 The hard laws in the strictest sense have been developed by the Security Council through S/RES/1267; S/RES/1373, 
para.1; UN, S/RES1390, para.2. These are the major standards to define hard law. However, the resolutions do not 
provide additional guidance for their implementation in a real situation. See Koh, 2006, p. 155. 
12 Report by the Chair of the Counter-Terrorism Committee on the problems encountered in the implementation of 
Security Council resolution 1373 (2001). 
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fundamental legal systems are substantially based on the common law tradition. Like any model, it 
will need to be adjusted to ensure both domestic legal validity (eg, in terms of constitutional 
principles and other basic concepts of its legal system) and domestic operational effectiveness (eg, 
in terms of implementing arrangements and infrastructure). 
 
With the aim of monitoring the implementation of the resolutions and the harmonisation of 
international instruments within national legislations, the UN created the Counter Terrorism 
Committee (CTC). In a number of subsequent resolutions, the Security Council referred to best 
practices, codes and standards as tools that can assist States in their implementation of the 
resolution. In its Resolution 1377 (2001), the Council invited the Committee ‘to explore ways in 
which States can be assisted, and in particular to explore with international, regional and sub 
regional organisations… the promotion of best-practice in the areas covered by resolution 1373 
(2001), including the preparation of model laws as appropriate…’. In its resolution 1456 (2003), 
paragraph 4 (iii), the Council requested the Committee, in monitoring the implementation of the 
resolution, ‘to bear in mind all international best practices, codes and standards which are relevant 
to the implementation of resolution 1373 (2001)’ and in its resolution 1566 (2004), paragraph 7, the 
Council requested the Committee ‘in consultation with relevant international, regional and sub 
regional organisations and the United Nations bodies to develop a set of best practices to assist 
States in implementing the provisions of resolution 1373 (2001) related to the financing of 
terrorism’. 
 
As a result of multilateral action taken under UNSCRs 1267 and 1373, more than 170 countries 
have implemented blocking orders to freeze the assets of terrorists. According to the Department of 
Treasury, US$147 million in assets of terrorist organisations have been blocked or frozen world-
wide since 11 September 2001 (Eckert, 2008).13 
 
After the CTC’s revitalisation in 2004, an Executive Directorate was created. The key functions of 
the Counter Terrorism Executive Directorate (CTED) are: to provide in-depth analysis of the 
implementation of resolution 1373 (2001) by States; to engage States in a dialogue through letters, 
direct conversations and visits on a flexible and tailored basis; and to act as a facilitator or broker of 
technical assistance to countries where vulnerabilities in their counter-terrorism responses have 
been identified. It can link this country, or a donor country or international agency that has the 
relevant expertise to help it overcome the problem and to keep in touch with international, regional 
and sub-regional organisations. 
 
At this point, it is appropriate to outline how the actions taken by countries to meet international 
standards and reporting have created a huge burden, particularly for those low-income countries 
without the capacity and resources. 
 
                                                 
13 Further discussion on one of the cornerstones of the counter-terrorism measures  such as ‘the freezing of funds to 
persons and entities suspected o having links with terrorism’ can be found in O’Neill (2008) and Guild (2008). Guild 
remarks on the way in which the listing took place and how its consequences for individuals has raised serious 
questions of human rights compliance. See also ‘Judgement of the Court of First Instance of the European Communities 
in case T-315/01 Yassin Abdullah Kadi 2005, T-306/01Yusuf 2005 ECR II-3533, T-228/02 Organisation des 
Modjahedine du people d’ Iran 2006 and T-47/03 Sisson 2007’. ‘The Court of First Instance of the European 
Communities, when requested to examine the legality of an implementing law, did not criticize the UN Sanctions 
Regime, even though it forces the EU and its Member States to blindly follow a process that most likely violates 
fundamental human rights like the right to a fair hearing and effective judicial review’.(Pieth, 2006, p. 1086). In 
accordance with Vleck (2006), the situation was complicated by the fact that there were a number of different lists of 
named terrorists floating around at a national and international level. The unresolved problem concerning the 
administrative or executive freezing provisions has led to the lack of sufficient de-freezing procedures: several rules 
require the creating and public announcement of de-listing and de-freezing procedures. Although the policy 
community’s enthusiastic embrace of financial restrictions and the apparent success to date, complications have arisen 
and potential problems loom with the increased reliance on such tools (Eckert, 2008). 
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Murthy (2007) highlights the ‘Lack of interest among poor countries (some of whom believe that 
terrorism is a problem of the Western Countries) is due to the absence of incentives in return for 
their cooperation. (…) there is a huge deficit in the desired level of cooperation and coordination 
between regional/sub-regional organizations and the CTC’ (Murthy, 2007, p. 8) 
 
Ward (2003) points out that post-11 September, ‘the council sets out certain mandatory measures to 
prevent and suppress international terrorism, including reporting to the CTC on actions taken to 
implement the resolution 1373 (2001), no State met all the requirements, and it created a 
tremendous burden, particularly for those of a lesser degree of capacity and resources’ (Ward, 2003, 
p. 289). Here, it is likewise relevant to state the lack of resources and coordination between bodies 
and organisations in keeping with the works of several scholars. 
 
Luck (2005) remarked that some operational areas including the Security Council as well as the 
CTD ‘remain understaffed and under-funded’, and that ‘the proliferation of international of 
international counter-terrorism efforts raises worrisome questions about coordination and 
coherence, even as it should quell claims that this is a simple choice between unilateralism and 
multilateralism, between going it alone and working with others’ (Luck, 2005, p. 25). 
 
Similarly to Koh (2006), the researcher considers that the question of sanctions deserves great 
attention as a strategy to make the AML/CFT campaign effective. When a country, upon 
assessment, is found to be non-compliant with the AML/framework, the international community 
might impose sanctions on that country. The CTC has not applied its chapter VII powers to impose 
sanctions on States which are not compliant with the requirements of Resolution 1373. At present, 
CTC only reports a list of States that have been late in submitting state reports in accordance with 
Resolution 1373. 
 
Regarding the impact of corruption on ML and FT issues, two more Conventions have been taken 
into account for the scope of this research. In response to the threat posed by corruption, the UN 
passed the 2003 United Nations Convention against Corruption. 
 
This is the first legally-binding multilateral treaty to address the problems relating to corruption. On 
a global basis it requires parties to institute a comprehensive domestic regulatory and supervisory 
Regime for banks and financial institutions to deter and detect ML. The Regime must emphasise 
requirements for customer identification, record-keeping and suspicious transaction reporting. In 
accordance with article 68 (1) of the aforementioned resolution, the United Nations Convention 
against Corruption came into force on 14 December 2005. The Convention is also concerned with 
the links between corruption and forms of crime, in particular organised crime and ML. In the 
timeframe of this working paper, few parties have ratified this important Convention. 
 
So far, we have revised the effectiveness of the efforts made by the UN to achieve the ratification 
and implementation of UN Conventions. In this working paper we state that there is a lack of 
resources in the countries concerned to pass legislation as well as a lack of coordination between 
bodies and organisations. The UN Conventions have created a huge burden, particularly for those 
low-income countries without the capacity and resources. 
 
 
The Financial Action Task Force and Mutual Evaluation 
Continuing the review of the institutions’ contribution to AML/CFT effectiveness, the second step 
is to evaluate The Financial Action Task Force (FATF). The role of this body relies upon what are 
technically ‘non-binding standards’ supported by a soft enforcement mechanism. The roots of 
counter-FT lie in the anti-Money Laundering initiatives adopted globally, regionally and nationally 
 6
during the 1990s. The FATF is an intergovernmental organisation established in 1989 by the G714 
countries, working as a policy-making group prepared for suggesting legislative and regulatory 
action to counter ML.15 The Forty Recommendations of the FATF constitute the international 
standard for effective AML/CFT measures. 
 
The FATF regularly sees to it that its members check their compliance with these Forty 
Recommendations (as well as the Nine Special Recommendations on Terrorist Financing) and 
suggests areas for improvement through periodic mutual evaluations. The FATF identifies 
emerging trends and methods used to launder money and it suggests measures to combat them. An 
extensive analysis of the funding methods of terrorist groups and of the financial resources 
supporting terrorist activities has been carried out by the FATF. 
 
The Forty Recommendations,16 issued in 1990 and updated in 1996, constitute a legal framework 
involving patterns of ML. These recommendations include requirements for States to criminalise 
ML activities, to adopt customer identification and record-keeping practices and to commit 
themselves to cooperating with other States and IOs in AML activities. This case of ‘soft law’ 
responds to the logic of informal commitments, which States can spontaneously comply with. In 
this case, the efforts undertaken by the FAFT constitute the general and main reference for 
international and domestic legislation. 
 
The 2001 FAFT review identified a problem: ML is actively investigated and prosecuted in a 
limited number of countries, while elsewhere the offence is not frequently prosecuted. The UN 
General Assembly Resolution 51/210 of 17 December 1996 recognised the specific nature of FT, 
not only where it is linked to drug dealing, arms trafficking and other criminal methods, but also to 
legal and non-criminal institutions. 
 
At an extraordinary plenary meeting on the FT held in Washington (2001), the FAFT17 decided to 
expand the function of the FAFT beyond ML. Eight Special Recommendations were appended to 
the existing Forty Recommendations. Thus, the list of potential legal sources of finance was 
expanded to include the collection of membership dues and/or subscriptions, sales of publications, 
speaking tours, cultural and social events, and examples of legitimate businesses supporting 
terrorism, including publishing, food production, building construction and computers. 
 
The UN and FATF Recommendations set the root and direction for national efforts aimed at 
reducing the vulnerability of domestic financial systems to terrorist manipulation. AML legislation 
was finally especially extended to deal with FT. There should be little difficulty in expanding the 
scope of domestic and international AML measures and other measures and legislation to cover the 
funding and ML activities of terrorist networks. But the key factors lie in ‘legitimate sources’, state 
financial sponsorship, donations and contributions from supporters, which complicates the puzzle. 
 
The lack of regulation of the financial system –offering attractive opportunities for terrorists to 
achieve their criminal goals, enabling a profitable management of financial resources as well as 
their transfer through informal banking channels– adds complexity to the situation. For this reason, 
the CFT strategy turns out to be more than a matter of combating an ordinary financial crime 
because of the involvement in the FT of legitimate entities and legitimate financial resources, trade, 
                                                 
14 The G-7 countries are Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the UK and the US. 
15 http:// www.fatf-gafi.org/. Membership of the FAFT includes 29 countries plus two regional organisations (EC and 
Gulf Cooperation Council), representing all the main financial centres in North America, Europe, Asia and the Middle 
East, who band together for the purposes of investigating means to combat money laundering in all its forms. The 
FAFT coordinates global anti-money laundering activities working together with a variety of regional and international 
organizations. 
16 Forty Recommendations, http://www.fatf-gafi.org/pdf/40Recs-2003_en.pdf. 
17 See FATF-GAFI, 2001a, p. 16-19. 
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humanitarian aid, etc, which use small amounts of money and the banking networks to elude the 
existing monitoring and controlling schemes. 
 
In the conclusion to the 1990 FATF report, it was admitted that ‘a regular assessment of progress 
realized in enforcing Money Laundering measures would stimulate countries to give these issues a 
high priority’ (Levi, 2002b, p. 96). FATF II decided to supplement a process of self-assessment 
with a system of mutual evaluation, examined by selected other members of the FATF, according to 
an agreed protocol for examination and agreed selection criteria. Since the initial round of mutual 
evaluation, its major purpose has been to assess the degree of formal compliance with the 
Recommendations. 
 
Levi and Gilmore have underlined the international significance of the FATF precedent of the rise 
of mutual evaluation processes: 
 
‘That to submit to periodic on- site inspection by one’s peers, constituted a radical departure from 
the orthodoxy of international affairs, where considerations of autonomy and sensitivities about 
territorial sovereignty have traditionally dominated governmental thinking’ (Levi, 2002b, p. 108). 
 
They believed the FATF Recommendations are a form of ‘soft law’ and these Recommendations do 
not formally entail a matter of international law. Some Recommendations may have been 
implemented into customary international law but many are regarded as lacking in any mandatory 
legal effect. 
 
In line with the idea of the use of mutual evaluation reports to evaluate the compliance with the 
FATF Recommendations by countries/jurisdictions, Savona (1997) points out that one of the most 
delicate problems of the AML regulation and its control is that the enactment of legislation and 
issuance of regulations are obvious important steps, but their implementation is more important and 
more difficult to assess objectively. Official data on implementation, such as that provided though 
the mutual evaluation reports18 of the FATF, are essential for him. He also referred in his work to 
the difficulties in analysing cross-laundering data from different countries because every country 
will display peculiarities in criminal behaviours, policies, implementation, recording and reporting, 
which makes any kind of meaningful aggregation difficult. 
 
On the premise that the mutual evaluation report is the best tool for evaluating the implementation 
of FATF Recommendations by countries, we will extrapolate the results of 46 jurisdictions’ mutual 
evaluations in order to determine the global level of compliance.19 This captures the fact that 
countries/jurisdictions may well comply with some Recommendation while not complying with 
others. 
 
To date, response policies towards non-compliance have been active to the extent of threatening to 
suspend FATF membership of some countries until the Recommendations have been implemented. 
The issue of non-compliance policy merits greater examination by this researcher in the sense of 
‘establishing the minimum compliance’ that should be achieved among FATF members because at 
present the Recommendations allow a considerable discretion in their application. 
                                                 
18 The present author, when researching how to obtain the information about mutual evaluation reports, takes into 
account the recommendations given by IO officials. An UNODC official suggested looking through the websites of 
regional FATF-style bodies: ‘there you will find reports and evaluation results of FIU and AMF/CFT regimes’. Also, a 
FATF official answered to the questionnaire that ‘to find the statistics that you are looking for, I would suggest that you 
consult the FATF mutual evaluation reports for FATF member countries that are published on our website at www.fatf-
gafi.org’. Furthermore, a Moneyval Official recommended the author ‘to visit the FATF website www.fatf-gafi.org, 
which contains many interesting documents, including evaluation reports, which might be useful for your research’. 
Furthermore, a Reserve Federal Bank official recommended the author to try the IMF/World Bank AML assessments 
for various countries. FATF started a third round of mutual evaluations for its members in January 2005. 
19 Definitions of compliance, primary rule system, a compliance information system and a non-compliance response 
system can be found in Mitchell (2006, p. 141-143). 
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With regard to response policies toward non-member countries, the FATF applies the same 
measures as with member countries. Nonetheless, the FATF can recommend broader 
countermeasures.20 With the aim of evaluating non-FATF members, the Non-Cooperative Countries 
and Territories (NCCTs) exercise began in 1998 when the majority of the countries did not have 
AML measures in place. The intent of this initiative is to secure the adoption by all financial centres 
of international standards to prevent, detect and punish ML, and to reach effective international 
cooperation in the global fight against ML/FT. 
 
‘In February 2000, the FATF published the initial report on NCCTs, which included 25 criteria 
identifying detrimental rules and practices that impede international co-operation in the fight against 
Money Laundering. The exercise reviewed 47 jurisdictions in two rounds of reviews (31 in 2000) 
and (16 in 2001). A total of 23 jurisdictions were identified as NCCTs (15 in 200021 and 8 in 
2001).22 No additional jurisdictions have been reviewed under this process since 2001’ (FATF-
GAFI, 2006). 
 
In the last year, the FATF agreed to the removal of Nauru and Nigeria from the NCCT list. The 
FATF is also ending a formal monitoring of countries de-listed prior to June 2005. The future 
monitoring of these countries will be conducted within the context of the relevant FSRBs and their 
evaluation mechanisms. Some of the countries within the sample have been pressured because of 
their being unregulated jurisdictions and have been included in the NCCT list in 2000-01, which 
includes countries such as Panama and Hungary. In this dissertation, we shall pay special attention 
to the evolution of the AML/CFT implementation in these countries. As of writing, only Myanmar 
is still considered by the FATF to be an NCCT. 
 
In the light of the results of NCCT23 evaluation, non-compliance response policies should be 
implemented in accordance with FATF,24 consisting of measures such as: actions to put an end to 
the detrimental rules and practices; counter-measures designed to protect economies against money 
of unlawful origin; specific requirements for financial institutions in FATF members to pay special 
attention to, or report on, financial transactions conducted with individuals or legal entities having 
their account at financial institutions established in a ‘non-cooperative jurisdiction’; and 
conditioning, restricting, targeting or even prohibiting financial transactions with non-cooperative 
jurisdictions. There have been, to my mind, two failures of the NCCT exercise. First, the NCCT 
criteria application does not contain references to combating the financing of terrorism 
requirements, ‘if NCCT criteria included these [CFT] elements in the future, a link could be 
secured to the binding resolutions of the Security Council (…). Security Council Resolution 1373 
imposes binding obligations on all States to suppress the financing of terrorism and in this sense, 
there could be further justification for the NCCT initiative under the authority of Security Council’ 
(Koh, 2006, p. 166). 
                                                 
20 For further discussion on these countermeasures that ‘should be gradual, proportionate and flexible regarding their 
means and taken in concerted action towards a common objective’ see FAFT (2002, p. 6) as well as cited in Koh (2006, 
p. 164). 
21 Antigua and Barbuda, Belize, Bermuda, British Virgin Islands, Cyprus, Gibraltar, Guernsey, Isle of Man, Jersey, 
Malta, Mauritius, Monaco, Samoa, Seychelles, St Lucia, Vanuatu, Bahamas, Cayman Islands, Cook Islands, Dominica, 
Israel, Lebanon, Liechtenstein, Marshall Islands, Nauru, Niue, Panama, Philippines, Russia, St. Kitts &Nevis, St 
Vincent &the Grenadines (the 15 jurisdictions identified as NCCTs at that time are in italics). 
22 Costa Rica, Czech Republic, Palau, Poland, Slovakia, Turks & Caicos Islands, United Arab Emirates, Uruguay, 
Egypt, Grenada, Guatemala, Hungary, Indonesia, Myanmar, Nigeria and Ukraine (the eight Jurisdictions identified as 
NCCTs at that time are in italics). 
23 Discussion on the controversy of a non-universal body seeks to enforce non-binding standards on non- member 
countries (NCCT); see Koh (2006); Mitsilegas (2003); and Jonhson et al. (2002). It has been seen that FATF member 
countries consider the domestic policies and legal systems of the identified NCCTs to be undermining their legitimate 
national interests. In other words, the FATF members imposed a ‘standardisation’ (eg, in October 2007, the FAFT was 
concerned that the Islamic Republic of Iran’s lack of a comprehensive (AML/CFT) regime represented a significant 
vulnerability within the international financial system. The FATF called upon Iran to address its AML/CFT deficiencies 
on an urgent basis. The FAFT members advised their financial institutions to take the risk arising from the deficiencies 
in Iran’s AML/CFT regime into account for enhanced due diligence. 
24 For further detail on counter-measures see FATF (2000, p. 7-9). 
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Secondly, the FATF members have imposed a harmonisation of its standards to non-FATF 
members. When applying its Recommendations25 for AML/CFT compliance, it has been rare for 
the FATF to inform the CTC of this fact. The present researcher agrees with Koh that this lack of 
initiative to list a ‘non-compliant state twice’ by FATF and CTC has decreased the effectiveness of 
AML/CFT strategy world-wide. 
 
Transgovernmental Financial Regulatory Organisations 
Prior to closing the section that evaluates the role of IOs and bodies in the consecution of 
AML/CFT effectiveness, we must also take into account the transgovernmental regulatory 
organisations, which have played a leading role in the AML/CFT strategy. Recent work on 
transnational politics suggests that international organizations as transnational governmental 
networks (Slaughter, 2004) and epistemic communities (Haas, 1992) may have a strong impact on 
areas previously thought to lie within the domain of domestic governance. 
 
For this reason, we will pay attention to issues that constrain the transgovernmental regulatory 
organisation for protecting the integrity of the financial system. We shall review such regulatory 
organisations as the Basel Committee, IAIS and IOSCO. It should be noted at this point that the 
regulation relies on its members to implement its Recommendations within their respective 
countries. 
 
Reports on overall compliance with integrity standards found that regulators had a lack of authority 
to investigate, limited access to time-sensitive data needed for surveillance purposes, insufficient 
resources for inspection, surveillance and investigation, and often a limited enforcement mandate. 
The reports also underline that there is a clear need for more efficient methods to disseminate 
information to the public and to improve the quality of the information being released. 
 
Reports conclude that weaknesses in the implementation of many of the BCP, IAIS and IOSCO 
principles were evident across a range of jurisdictions, although the most marked concerns where 
those related to assessments of developing and emerging markets. The implementation of these 
rules applicable to financial systems greatly differs among countries within the same region. For 
this reason, one should point out the necessity to supplement and emphasise effective regional 
‘surveillance’ mechanisms for the improvement of all integrity standards. 
 
The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (Basel Committee) was formed in 1974 by the 
central bank governors of the Group of 10 Countries.26 It has issued three documents covering ML 
                                                 
25 In accordance with FATF’s Recommendation 21, financial institutions should give special attention to business 
relationships and transactions with persons, including companies and financial institutions, from countries which do not 
or insufficiently apply the FATF Recommendations. Whenever these transactions have no apparent economic or visible 
lawful purpose, their background and purpose should, as far as possible, be examined, the findings established in 
writing, and be available to help competent authorities. Where such a country continues not to apply or insufficiently 
applies the FATF Recommendations, countries should be able to apply appropriate countermeasures. In accordance 
with Recommendation 21, the FATF recommends that financial institutions give special attention to business relations 
and transactions with persons, including companies and financial institutions, from the ‘non-cooperative countries and 
territories’ and in so doing take into account issues raised in relevant summaries of the annual NCCT reports and any 
progress made by these jurisdictions since being listed as NCCTs. The FATF itself does not determine what specific 
measures financial institutions must take. It is up to each country to issue its own specific guidance or regulations with 
which financial institutions must comply. 
26 http://www.bis.org/index.htm. The group of 10 countries is a misnomer, since there are 13 member countries. The 
Basel committee members (as well as the Group of 10) are: Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, 
Luxemburg, The Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the UK and the US. Also, a private initiative, the Wolfsberg 
Group, has developed a Guide on a Risk-Based Approach for Managing Money Laundering Risks to support risk 
management and assist institutions in exercising business judgement with respect to their clients. The Wolfsberg Group 
consists of the following leading international financial institutions: ABN AMRO, Banco Santander, Bank of Tokyo-
Mitsubishi-UFJ, Barclays, Citigroup, Credit Suisse, Deutsche Bank, Goldman Sachs, HSBC, JP Morgan Chase, Société 
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issues: 
 
(1) Statement on Prevention of Criminal Use of the Banking System for the Purpose of Money 
Laundering. It contains 4 principles that should be used by banking institutions: (a) proper 
customer identification; (b) high ethical standards and compliance with laws and regulations; 
(c) cooperation with law enforcement authorities; and (d) policies and procedures to be used to 
adhere to. 
 
(2) The 25 core principles for effective banking supervision, stipulating that bank supervision must 
determine that they have adequate policies and procedures in place, including strict know-your-
customer (KYC) rules. Core principle 15 is linked to AML policies put in place. 
 
(3) A paper called ‘customer due diligence for banks’: this paper provides extensive guidance on an 
appropriate CDD policy. 
 
Recent assessments27 of compliance with these regulatory standards found that 45% of the 
evaluated countries (36) have inadequate or no legal framework to comply with the Core Principle 
15. The report states the following: 
 
‘Preconditions for effective banking supervision are generally in place in advanced economies. In 
developing countries, a number of shortcomings in the underpinning infrastructure were observed: 
transparency is rather low, at times due to opaque financial statements and problems in accounting 
and auditing. However, many emerging markets that have recently experienced the transition to 
market economies face substantial challenges in making their accounting systems consistent with 
international practices, and the need to test and properly implement recent changes in their legal 
system’ (IMF, 2004, p. 13). 
 
The use of insurance for the scope of ML has been discussed in previous chapters of this 
dissertation. The international Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS), established in 1994, 
represents the insurance supervisory authorities from 130 jurisdictions. The role of the IAIS is to 
promote cooperation among insurance regulators; to set international standards for insurance 
supervision; to provide training to members; and to coordinate work with regulators in the other 
financial sectors and international financial institutions. 
 
In January 2002, the association issued the Guidance Paper No.5, Anti-Money Laundering 
Guidance Notes for Insurance Supervisors. This AML Guidance note should be implemented by 
jurisdictions taking into account the particular kind of insurance business offered within and the 
characteristics of its financial and legal system. 
 
Recent assessments of the IAIS core principles on insurance supervision on 42 countries concluded: 
‘that there is unclear jurisdiction of the insurance supervisory bodies over corporate governance 
issues, and the system depends on general corporate laws and regulations’. The report also shows 
that the ‘absence and deficiencies in the exchange of information with other supervisors’ (IMF, 
2004, p. 31). 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                  
Générale,andUBS. See 
http://www.baselgovernance.org/fileadmin/docs/pdfs/Industry_standards/Wolfsberg_RBA_paper.pdf. 
27 The FSAP assessments and key cross sector structural and regulatory risk factors in 36 countries show that: in Africa 
regulators and regulated at less than arm’s length distance and regulatory resources are inadequate, consolidated 
supervision is not in place, and regulatory cooperation is ill-defined; in Asia regulation is still on single lines of activity; 
in Europe the financial systems are strongly exposed to internationalization of capital flows; in the Middle East and 
Central Asia there is no instance of a unified regulator and there is a prevalence of Islamic financial principles; and in 
the Western Hemisphere there is a problem of disclosure and related party and intra-group transactions. 
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The International Organization of Securities Commissioners (IOSCO) passed a ‘Resolution on 
Money Laundering’ in 1992. The resolution provides that each IOSCO member should consider 
customer identifying information record-keeping requirements; ensure monitoring and compliance 
procedures designed to deter and detect ML and have appropriate powers to share information in 
order to combat ML. 
 
Recent assessments of the IOSCO principles implementation show that most assessors found that 
regulators had a lack of authority to investigate, had limited access to time-sensitive data needed for 
surveillance purposes, insufficient resources for inspection, surveillance and investigation, and 
often a limited enforcement mandate. With respect to issuers, there is a clear need for more efficient 
methods to disseminate information to the public and to improve the quality of the information 
being released. There is also a need to address the lack of harmonisation between international and 
domestic accounting and auditing standards. 
 
The Egmond Group of Financial Intelligence Units 
We may close this section with the review of the Egmond Group’s contribution to AML/CFT 
effectiveness. A few Financial Intelligence Units (FIUs)28 were created in 1990 in response to the 
lack of a central agency to receive, analyse and report the heterogeneous information needed to 
combat terrorism. In 2003 the FATF included explicit Recommendations on the establishment and 
functioning of FIUs. Over the last years the IMF and WB have recognised the importance of an FIU 
in the AML/CFT strategy and they have provided technical assistance to countries in the 
establishment and strengthening of FIUs. 
 
The existence of an FIU is justified due to the criminal behaviour of money launderers and 
terrorists, which is compared by contributors in a World Bank report to a ‘stream of water, 
following gravity and constantly prodding the banks for weak points through which it can spread 
further’. And this behaviour is the main challenge currently faced by FIUs: 
 
‘FIUs currently face more specific challenges. The most important ones are the integration of the 
financing of terrorism in their work, the broadening of the suspicious transaction reporting obligation 
beyond the regulated financial sector, and the quest for improved international cooperation’ (WB, 
2004, p. 92). 
 
Traditional FIUs have been used to deal with ML, but the strategy to fight against terrorism is 
different and it will force FIUs to integrate new functions (above all the rest) in those countries that 
have never faced terrorism. 
 
The extension of the reporting in the case of the designated non-financial businesses and 
professions (DNFBPs): casinos (which also includes internet casinos), real estate agents, dealers in 
precious metals, dealers in precious stones, the accounting and legal profession have had and will 
continue to have a wide implication for FIUs. My prediction on this matter is that the FIUs will 
have to devote specialised resources to supervise the new types of reports coming from DNFBPs. 
Against this background, it seems clear that the existence of an effective national FIU unit may help 
the effectiveness of the AML/CFT. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
28 For a broad explanation of the Financial Intelligences Units, see WB (2004), ‘Financial Intelligence Units: An 
Overview’, International Monetary Fund, p. 149. See also http://www.egmontgroup.org/ and see 
http://www.egmontgroup.org/statement_of _purpose.pdf. For a list of FIUs see 
http://www.egmontgroupl.org/list_of_fius_062304.pdf. 
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State Actors: Institutional Factors Limiting the Implementation of AML/CFT 
International Standards 
 
As was our goal when measuring29 the compliance of 46 countries with the AML/CFT (see Annex 
I), we have gained an understanding of the weaknesses and failures of the implementation of the 
AML/CFT standards which are presented as follows. In accordance with the results of jurisdictions’ 
compliance with the AML/CFT recommendations displayed in the annex, we shall now highlight 
the most important weaknesses of AML/CFT compliance, which not only correspond to the 
limitations of the countries/jurisdictions when it comes to developing domestic regimes, but also to 
the fact that the governments of these countries have not found support for their policies to tackle 
ML/FT from the regime participants. 
 
It is here that we may usefully explain the underlying weaknesses in worldwide compliance. These 
weaknesses may be categorised into four: (1) failure to ratify and implement international 
conventions on ML and FT in some countries; (2) inadequate customer identification policies in 
countries within all income groups; (3) countries fail to provide resources to supervise AML 
programmes and institutions; and (4) countries fail to enhance mutual legal assistance, information 
sharing and cooperation with national sectors and those across borders. 
 
Failure to Ratify and Implement International Conventions on ML and FT in Some Countries 
The international legislative Regime against terrorism is characterised by diversity and 
fragmentation in the way it shows the ratifications of the international Convention on Terrorism. 
Despite the existing anti-terrorist Conventions before 2001, they are not universal. Technical 
standards developed for fighting against ML and FT have not been adopted by a great number of 
States. International anti-terrorism laws only exist on paper in many countries. The most important 
weakness for the AML/CFT lies in the inability of the international community to find a definition 
of terrorism, something that has constrained the system, and this situation permits the existence of 
havens for terrorist networks. 
 
Furthermore, when analysing the mutual evaluation assessments, one realises that the names of 
terrorist groups are different depending on who has compiled them: the UN, the EU, the US or the 
UK. There are no international agreements as to what constitutes terrorism and FT (eg, the IRA is a 
terrorist group for the UK, but not for the US; Hezbollah is a terrorist group for the US but not for 
the EU). 
 
In some countries, the list of predicate offences does not respect the 40 Recommendations. There is 
only a limited number of predicate crimes for ML and it means that incrimination of ML is not fully 
consistent with the Vienna and Palermo Conventions. When ML is prevalent in a country, it 
generates more crime and corruption, and the effects of countries’ attractiveness for ML purposes 
have been broadly discussed by Unger (2006). 
 
There is also an inadequate, weak and selective enforcement of AML/CFT provisions. The 
confiscation Regime is not clear and effective enough. Ineffective penalties, including difficult 
confiscation provisions are some of the reasons why the freeze strategy has not been more 
successful. The lack of ML prosecutions within the sample indicates that the Regime is not being 
effectively implemented. In the majority of countries, no sanction Regime exists for ML offences 
committed by natural persons acting as a front or on behalf of a trustee. 
 
In addition, the lack of harmonisation of corporate law worldwide can create a ‘domino effect’ on 
other laws and regulations, such as the criminal, administrative and banking laws. The greatest 
                                                 
29 The methodology to evaluate 46 jurisdictions’ compliance and detailed results of the analysis of compliance by 46 
jurisdictions with the FATF recommendations can be found in Verdugo (2008a) and Verdugo (2008b). 
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obstacles to international cooperation for the prevention of ML are still found in the area of 
‘identification of the real beneficial owner’. The main obstacle is a lack of regulation requiring full 
information regarding the real beneficial owner of a public or private limited company, especially 
when a legal entity is a shareholder or director, or the issuance of bearer shares is permitted. 
 
Inadequate Customer Identification Policies in Countries within All Income Groups 
The low level of overall compliance in this area is due to the fact that the costumer due diligence 
approach to fighting ML and FT is not a simple task and can contradict the culture of banking 
which is that of gaining clients. The compliance officer or risk manager in charge of ‘customer due 
diligence( CDD)’ tends to be in conflict with the incentives provided to customer service units 
dedicated to personal, private or offshore banking. In addition, national corporate law can affect the 
opacity/transparency of the financial system. Predominantly, the preventive measures have only 
been taken in formal economies. 
 
In relation to these results, it is convenient to revise a couple of issues related to preventive 
measures. In some countries, it has not been clearly shown that bank secrecy has been fully lifted 
by the AML national law. This research points out that some countries and jurisdictions put the 
financial system at risk while maintaining their secrecy laws. 
 
For example, in relation to Recommendation 5 Customer due diligence (CDD), 86% of the 
countries are not totally compliant with the core goal of the AML/CFT Regime, that is, to undertake 
customer due diligence measures, including identifying and verifying the identity of their customers 
when establishing business relations, carrying out occasional transactions, and when there is a 
suspicion of ML or FT and the financial institution has doubts about the veracity or adequacy of 
previously obtained customer identifications. 
 
Regarding the compliance with 9 Special Recommendations against the financing of terrorism, 
most countries deal ineffectively with the Special Recommendations related to preventive issues 
such as: the wire transfers still not being adequately recorded, the non-profit sector requiring greater 
control, greater effort being needed for detecting couriers and a similar need also extending to the 
use of bearer instruments. 
 
Countries Fail to Provide Resources to Supervise AML Programmes and Institutions 
The absence of a strong political commitment at the level of policy makers and legislators is a 
significant hindrance to the development and implementation of a robust AML/CFT framework as 
well as the high start-up and ongoing costs challenge the implementation of the AML/CFT Regime. 
Law Enforcement officers also need more police, customs agents need to stop smuggling, financial 
regulators need to strengthen their regulations and politicians need to be aware of their respective 
countries’ risk of terrorism and money laundering and to provide a reasonable degree of security for 
the citizens before whom they are ultimately responsible. In the long run, investment on these 
resources is likely to pave the way for the fight against ML/FT. 
 
Countries Fail to Enhance Mutual Legal Assistance, Information Sharing and Cooperation with 
National Sectors and those Across Borders 
The authorities’ power for cooperation is affected by the absence of clear rules. The lack of clear 
rules in ‘mutual legal assistance’ renders the process of international cooperation and the sharing of 
information less systematic. Some weaknesses must be overcome in order to enhance international 
cooperation. It is necessary to find gateways for sharing information while protecting legitimate 
rights to privacy and taking account of supervisors’ confidentiality obligations; sharing information 
among supervisors of different sectors (eg, between banking, securities and insurance regulators); 
sharing information for regulatory, compliance, and law-enforcement purposes; solving the 
complexity of multiple gateways for information exchange; and harmonising laws and overcoming 
obstacles that arise in areas of extradition, mutual legal assistance and corporate law that can 
undermine the fight against terrorism. 
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From the results we have obtained it is patent that there are differences in attitudes and in agendas 
between different countries when it comes to dealing with the same problem. ‘Problem recognition, 
generation of policy proposals, and political events’ (Kingdon, 1995, p. 18), in this respect, is a key 
question prior to implementing the CFT strategy. 
 
According to the World Bank and the IMF, countries are facing the following challenges in 
implementing the recommended reforms: The first challenge for AML/CFT international 
harmonisation is to achieve sufficient political commitment. At the first stage, there is an absence of 
strong political commitment at the level of policy makers and legislators, which is a significant 
hindrance to the development and implementation of a robust AML/CFT framework. In some 
countries, the dedication of officials at the technical level of supervisory and law enforcement 
authorities is hampered by a lack of political commitment on the part of both government and 
parliament to pass legislation and assign the necessary resources. The first step for a strong political 
commitment lies in the ratification of the International Convention related to terrorism and ML. 
 
It is also important to underline that a political agenda is always evolving in time, especially in the 
case of FT and ML. In this respect, it would also be interesting to understand not only how certain 
topics came to be considered relevant, but also which factors lead to change within political 
agendas. The difficulties in the implementation of AML/CFT strategy lie in achieving a uniform 
perception of a global problem such as ML/FT as a priority issue in agendas the world over. 
Without this uniformity it is very difficult to achieve a convergence on the harmonisation of 
international standards. 
 
In addition to this agenda problem, there are others issues which explain the failure to implement 
the international recommendations, such as corruption and weak governance30. In environments 
where corruption is prevalent, legislators are less likely to enact strong and effective AML/CFT 
laws, and key institutions (courts, law enforcement and supervisory agencies) may be hindered 
from carrying out their official duties in an effective manner. Development of an AML/CFT 
Regime in such an environment also requires the establishment of an effective anti-corruption 
framework. In accordance with the above-mentioned arguments, the decision has been taken to 
include those Conventions, such as the UN ratification related to Corruption and the OECD Bribery 
Convention, in the list of needed compulsory ratifications to strengthen legal systems against ML 
and TF. 
 
According to the FATF: 
 
“Effective implementation of international AML/CFT standards requires not just appropriate 
legislative, regulatory and organisational structures but a robust system of governance to ensure the 
integrity of the systems in places’ (FATF-GAFI, 2006, p. 7). 
 
The FATF also points out that: 
 
‘The link between AML/CFT and corruption is two-fold. Firstly, the proceeds of corruption which 
may be considerable are susceptible to being laundered. Secondly, corruption, and poor governance 
arising from corrupt institutions (such as the judiciary, the police, or regulatory authorities) and/or 
individuals, can substantially blunt the effectiveness of an AML/CFT system’ (FATF-GAFI, 2006, p. 
7). 
 
Given this, there is a critical need to develop a greater understanding of how weak governance and 
corruption damage the effectiveness of AML/CFT systems. In addition, an institutional constraint 
for AMLCFT implementation is to be found in the high start-up and ongoing costs of implementing 
                                                 
30 This researcher has dedicated her doctoral thesis to assessing which factors explain jurisdictions’ compliance with 
AML/CFT Regime. Using a quantitative analysis it was determined in that thesis that corruption and weak governance 
are the key factors that hamper the implementation of the FATF Recommendations. See chapter 6, Verdugo (2008c). 
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the AML/CFT standard and lack of resources. Regarding the cost31 of adopting the fight against ML 
and FT, Cuellar and Rider point out the following: 
 
‘For the most part, where jurisdictions change their laws and even regulations to conform to some 
standard such as the FATF’s minimum standard the political authorities in the impacted jurisdiction 
retain control over budgets, enforcement policy, and prosecutorial discretion (ie, Bussey-discussing 
the Bahamas apparent failure to prioritize anti-laundering enforcement, despite having signalled an 
interest in complying with emerging international norms condemning laundering)’ (Cuellar, 2003, p. 
440). 
 
‘A serious issue in the minds of many is the price the financial and banking system is required to 
pay for the strategy of taking the profit out of crime. The costs involved in establishing, maintaining 
and demonstrating compliance are considerable by any standard. What is clear is that policing the 
anti-Money Laundering laws and their regulations represents a considerable in-house cost within the 
financial services and banking industry’ (Rider, 2004, p. 88) 
 
Furthermore, another institutional constraint for the implementation of AML/CFT standards is that 
of the maintenance of the sovereignty on justice and police matters. To illustrate this problem, we 
may take the case of the EU. It cannot be denied that the participation in the fight against terrorism 
and its financing has also proved to be an institutional challenge for the EU.32 
 
One could propose the following quotation to summarise this section: ‘There are three domestic 
factors that influence the development and implementation of CFT policy: (1) the perceptions held 
by domestic political leader of the costs and benefits of CFT policies; (2) the role of domestic 
political and social constituencies in influencing the formulation and implementation of CFT 
policies; and (3) the capacity of States to implement and enforce counter-terrorism finance 
prescriptions’ (Giraldo et al., 2007, p. 289). 
 
Private Actors: The Failure of the Risk Approach and the Impact of High Costs 
 
We have argued that the effectiveness of the AML/CFT regime is based on harmonising national 
legislations, for which reason it has sought to universalise the legal requirements of the AML/CFT 
strategy. Although we have said that legal requirements constitute the basis of the AML/CFT 
strategy, the core of this strategy lies in the prevention pillar based on the risk approach. Risk 
approach is understood as the crucial decision for a country to determine which entities and persons 
                                                 
31 ‘En el caso de España, donde el blanqueo de dinero mueve cerca de 15.000 millones de euros anuales, el GAFI ha 
llegado a solicitar el Gobierno que revise su sistema de supervisión sobre las entidades financieras y que se mejor la 
coordinación de las instituciones que llevan a cabo las inspecciones. De entre las razones que detecta el GAFI sobre las 
deficiencias en los controles de los bancos destaca una esencial: la falta de recursos del principal organismo encargado 
de vigilar los mecanismos de supervisión, el Servicio Español de Prevención de Blanqueo de Capitales e Infracciones 
Monetarias. El Sepblac solo cuenta con 77 profesionales de los cuales 8 son inspectores, 2000 inspectores persiguen el 
fraude a gran escala pero siempre es un personal muy reducido para supervisar bancos, inmobiliarias, promotoras, 
sociedades de inversión, joyerías, abogados, casinos y los más de 8000 alcaldes’ (Mazo, 2006, p. 1-2). According to 
Kochan (2004) ‘The UK government, for example, has advised banks an financial institutions to budget £120 million 
(182 million euros) collectively to comply with its money-laundering laws. “This is a gross underestimate”, says 
Martyn Bridges, Director of Bridges and partners (…) “those figures, don’t cover 10% of the true costs. The cost to UK 
banks would be £1 billion a year, assuming that everyone complied, which they won’t”’ (Kochan, 2004, p. A6). 
32 For detailed explanations of the EU fight against terrorist financing, see EU (2005), ‘Final Report: The Evaluation of 
National Anti-terrorist Arrangements: Improving National Machinery and Capabilities’, Council of Europe; and EU 
(2007), ‘Fight against terrorism financing-six monthly report’, Counter-terrorism Coordinator, Council of the European 
Union, Brussels, p. 10. ‘A tres años del 11-S y ocho meses del 11-M, un informe de la UE muestra graves 
incumplimientos y enormes lagunas (…) según fuentes de la UE, los socios no dan signos de enmendar el mayor de sus 
pecados en el ámbito preventivo de la lucha antiterrorista, que es la falta de intercambio e datos policiales y de 
inteligencia: La información no fluye. Los Estados no se fían’ (F. Garcia, 2004, ‘Europa sigue atrasada en la lucha 
antiterrorista’, La Vanguardia, Barcelona, p. 11). ‘Secondo i dati di Bruxelles a intralciare il “Piano d’azione” sono i 
cavilli burocratici e i conflitti di competenza’ (M. Castellaneta, 2005, ‘La lotta al terrore una questione europea’, Il sole-
24 ore el lunedi, p. 5). 
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should be covered by which requirements. Sometimes the preventive measures are only applied to 
financial institutions and only applied to non-financial businesses and professions on a more limited 
basis. 
 
Most legal scholars and practitioners agree with the idea that the risk approach of the AML/CFT 
strategy has been unsuccessfully implemented. Freeland (2002) insists ‘that despite the efforts done 
by BCB to respond to FT introducing a risk-based approach and also the FATF’s successful 
initiatives in its member countries, many countries still had no Know Your Costumer standards at 
all’ (Pieth, 2002, p. 43). Freeland is one of the most important contributors to accentuate that 
terrorists will try to hide their true names behind anonymous accounts or ‘fronts’ making use of 
trusts, charities, nominees, corporate vehicles, profession intermediaries, and so on, and the present 
researcher agrees with him that the financial institutions (eg, banking) must make every effort to 
establish the beneficial owner(s) of all accounts and persons who conduct regular business with it. 
 
He also argues why the implementation of risk approach has been so difficult: ‘how conducting 
customer due diligence is not a simple task and is full of contradictions due to the culture of 
banking’. In the case of offshore banks, the compliance officer or risk manager in charge of 
customer due diligence will be in constant conflict with the incentives provided for customer 
service units dedicated to personal private or offshore banking. 
 
Others argue that another difficulty in the provision of CDD by financial institutions in CFT is to be 
found in the definition of what constitutes a terrorist or a terrorist organisation. This classification is 
a difficult issue which the terrorist groups take advantage of. 
 
Another argument for the failure of risk approach has been put forward by Savona. He argued, like 
Freeland, that ‘the greatest obstacles to international co-operation for the prevention of ML are to 
be found in the area of the identification of the real beneficial owner’ (Pieth, 2002, p. 83). He also 
highlights that the main obstacle is a lack of regulation requiring full information about the real 
beneficial owner of a public or private limited company, especially when a legal entity is a 
shareholder or director, or the issuance of bearer sharer is permitted. Savona and Freeland 
contribute to the understanding of how corporate law could affect the opacity/ transparency of the 
financial system. The ‘domino effect’ of company law on other laws and regulations such as 
criminal, administrative and banking law are, according to them, an additional factor of the failure 
on the risk approach. 
 
Up to now, we have argued that factors such as the lack of implementation of the risk approach in 
financial institutions and the different corporate laws within jurisdictions have led to the failure of 
the prevention pillar. Now we shall argue that this failure is partially due to misguided efforts to 
implement the same risk approach policy in countries with disparate types of economy. 
 
Among those defending this idea is Ware (2004), who states that responding to financial abuse and 
achieving the stability of the global financial system through preventive measures seems to be more 
of a crisis reaction than a rational policy, for the AML/CFT is a standardised code applied in 
developing and developed countries without taking into account the preconditions of governance in 
each country, thus creating a wide gap between the developed and the developing world because 
this kind of reforms will add cost and complexity to business transactions. 
 
De Goede (2004), in accordance with the idea of the social and political consequences of the war on 
terrorist finance, also points out that ‘the risk approach policy which seeks to define and classify 
suspicious transactions and leading intensive surveillance is exacerbating financial exclusion, 
through more stringent ‘know-your-costumer regulation’. Goede (2004) and Passas (2004) argue 
that the war on terrorist finance is affecting the communities sending informal remittances and that 
‘cash’ is becoming suspect. The present researcher agrees with Goede that the combating of FT 
strategy seems to be a policy to reduce the use of cash world-wide. 
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The question that arises here is whether the AML/CFT can be viewed as a balanced solution that 
avoids unnecessary burdens on the globalised economy. The international initiatives that run the 
risk approach only constitute a suitable remedy for countries with high-quality financial systems. In 
fact, it is unrealistic to establish regulations to be implemented by developing countries with 
unsatisfactory law enforcement structures, poor technology and a lack of financial culture. 
 
The key challenges of implementing standards world-wide across continents and countries that are 
at very different stages of economic development still remain in place. If the international 
community attempts to impose a prevention pillar and risk approach that are inappropriate for a 
country’s level of development and national resources, this strategy might have no effect or simply 
a modest one on these countries’ compliance with international standards. The existence of a large 
gap between countries that attain a high level of compliance with the standards and those that do 
not could eventually lead to countries being denied access to some financial markets (Johnston et 
al., 2006). 
 
The failure of the preventive measures seems to indicate the overall incapacity of jurisdictions to 
orientate the preventive Recommendations towards the risk approach goal rather than that of crime 
reduction. The preventive Recommendations and the risk approach have only constituted a good 
remedy for countries with high-quality financial systems and have also created high start-up and 
ongoing cost to developed and developing countries. 
 
Other two major challenges remain in place. First, in general, the preventive Recommendations 
have not been applied to all the groups of concerns such as financial institutions, insurance and 
securities sector and Designated Non-Financial Businesses Professions. 
 
All in all, it can be said that most countries have a low perception of ML and FT risk and a great 
deal of financial activity is excluded or subject only to limited controls. Consequently, a low flow 
of information between public and private sectors about CDD may exist wherever the risk is not 
taken into account. 
 
Other legal scholars agree that the failures of the risk approach are due to the discourse of the IOs. 
They have accused the FATF of having ‘a discourse primarily oriented not so much towards risk 
management as towards national and institutional obligation to reduce crime facilitation’ (Levi et 
al., 2002, p. 40). 
 
Geiger et al. (2007) point out that the results of the existing AML prevention measures are 
disappointing –crimes closely connected with ML still prosper–. Meanwhile, ‘banks being the main 
actors involved in ML prevention face high burdens’ (Geiger et al., 2007, p. 100). Moreover, they 
admit that the rule-based approach could not follow the new methods and technologies used by 
money launderers and the regulators failed to ‘formulate detailed ML criteria’ (Geiger et al., 2007, 
p. 100). 
 
In line with the failure of regulated approach failure, Ross et al. (2007) observe that overregulation, 
which often replaces regulation, leads to additional costs, inflexibility and poor regulatory 
performance (Ross et al., 2007, p. 107). As has been discussed in this dissertation, the main focus 
of AML compliance is placed on financial institutions (banks) rather than the meaning of collective 
action. 
 
Furthermore, some authors cite reporting overload as the main disadvantage of the regulation. 
Jackman (2004) notes that ‘there is a fine line between regulation and overregulation’ (Jackman, 
2004, p. 106). He agrees that ‘overregulation can worsen the results achieved from ML prevention’ 
(Jackman, 2004, p. 109). But the most important contribution of Jackman is that one important 
effect of regulation is that the practitioners tend to decrease their willingness to find AML/CFT 
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solutions. In connection with the argument of excessive regulation, Edwards et al. (2004) argue that 
‘there is a need for the regulator and banks to work as partners’ (Edwards et al., 2004, p. 223). 
 
Examples of countries with a rule-based regulation are provided by Pieth (2004). According to him, 
some large financial centres (UK and US) place more emphasis on an ‘early warning system’ with 
the recording of everyday transactions and the reporting of unusual or suspicious circumstances for 
future strategic and tactical use by the police or similar authorities, whereas in other large financial 
centres (ie, Switzerland), the AML-system is far less oriented towards data collection for 
intelligence and law enforcement purposes. 
 
Finally, we should outline that the failure of the prevention pillar could be attributed to cost benefits 
arguments: that while the cost of ML prevention for the society and financial institutions are high, 
the benefits are not clearly seen. There is no data on ML showing that an adequate regulatory 
control reduces the ML taking place. The benefits of compliance are usually seen as ‘flowing from 
the costs that are otherwise avoided’ (Harvey, 2004, p. 336). The benefit of compliance lies in the 
possibility of avoiding severe sanctions from the regulator. 
 
What Would be the Most Effective Strategy to Tackle the Financing of Terrorism? 
 
In conclusion, it is safe to say that terrorist are still able to raise, move, store and access funds with 
relative ease and the threat terrorist groups pose to the international community could be 
dramatically increased. The international cooperation is far from being up to the task of efficiently 
dealing with the financing of terrorism, for the failings pointed out in the present article such as: the 
failure of deterrent effects, the lack of preventive intelligence and the incapacity to deny terrorist 
groups easy access to financing them (disrupting tool). The challenges in strengthening the 
International Regime to Combat the Financing of Terrorism conceal the reality of three tensions 
that hinder progress in this direction. The first of these tensions lies between financial regulation 
and political will, while the second tension is that of the difficult interaction between international 
standards and their domestic implementation. The third tension, operating at the domestic level, 
occurs between government and financial and non-financial institutions. 
 
The future international cooperation in the fight against the financing of terrorism must not merely 
stem from the relations between states, but also from enhancing an interaction between domestic 
and international games and coalitions such as transnational regulatory networks and financial 
institutions spanning national boundaries. This cooperation model is the only one that may 
successfully initiate a reliable process of negotiation and socialisation with havens so as to open the 
possibility for them to become better regulated countries rather than havens. 
 
Against this background, a double step strategy is needed to overcome the failings and 
discrepancies between countries in building a more coordinated global strategy against the FT. In 
the first step, the States should recognise that they have failed to pay attention to the adequate 
criminalisation of FT, to establish a clear approach towards informal transfer systems, to establish 
consistent freezing of assets and an approach towards international legal cooperation. 
 
This strategy must, first, achieve a common definition of terrorism and a strict definition of the FT; 
secondly, convince all stakeholders that action is required at the global level; thirdly, ensure true 
commitment and a resolute political will in CFT; and fourth, take into account the increasing global 
nexus between crime and terror and its negative effect, in addition to becoming aware of the fact 
that terrorists continue to use Failed States and jurisdictions which slow down the implementation 
of the AML/CFT Regime. 
 
It also seems necessary to create a global index of country vulnerability/risk to FT in order to 
improve the capacity of international community to monitor and control key havens used by 
terrorist financiers. 
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To accomplish these objectives, the following measures can be used to put pressure on the entire 
world system because there still remain loopholes in the area of financial regulation. As the ML/FT 
problem is global in nature, measures should be once again implemented, in accordance with the 
FATF, in order to put an end to the detrimental rules and practices evidenced by this paper. More 
counter-measures such as the negotiations with uncooperative jurisdictions should be started up 
again when FATF members and non-members fail to cooperate in combating the financing of 
terrorism. Some norms should be designed to protect economies against money of unlawful origin; 
specific requirements should be made for financial institutions in FATF members to pay special 
attention to, or report on, financial transactions conducted with individuals or legal entities having 
their account at financial institutions established in a ‘non-cooperative jurisdiction’; there should be 
conditioning, restricting, targeting or even prohibiting of financial transactions with non-
cooperative jurisdictions. 
 
Part of this process of financial regulation should aim to improve the implementation of the 
complementary standards of AML/CFT such as those provide by Basle Committee on Banking 
Regulation, International Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS) and International 
Organisation of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) because they pave the way for the customer due 
diligence. National regulatory authorities and finance ministers are strongly encouraged to adapt 
and enhance existing mechanisms for international regulatory and supervisory coordination. The 
FATF and FATF-Style Regional Bodies are also obliged to establish a non-compliance policy 
response in the case of a jurisdiction with low rates of integrity standards compliance. The UN 
should revitalise the awareness-raising campaigns of the Counter-Terrorism Committee, given the 
significant role of this institution in CFT strategy. In addition, the international community should 
extend AML/CFT to fight corruption, incorporating new Recommendations focused on the control 
of corrupted practices in accordance with the 2003 UN Convention. In addition, complementary 
policies and strategies should be designed at an international level in areas being exploited by 
terrorist groups since certain aspects are insufficiently covered by the AML/CFT Regimes such as 
trade, corporate law, oil smuggling, maritime businesses and humanitarian aid and border controls. 
 
A second step would be to redesign the strategy taking into account not only previous weaknesses 
but also recognising that one size model does not fit all, especially when there are cash economies 
and failed States involved. The following points must be taken into account when building up the 
new strategy. First, the design and prioritisation of policy is an important point and it is also 
problematic because the goals of risk avoidance and related casualties are very difficult to measure. 
It is necessary to reject the traditional cost benefit analysis since a policy of combating FT consists 
in managing uncertainty and imprecise threats. Secondly, at this point the risk-based approach to 
CFT must be redefined and implemented differently, because a high number of Recommendations 
from international bodies have created a maze of requirements that overlaps efforts and undermines 
efficiency. 
 
A high level Interagency is needed to lead the national efforts on CFT strategy. Peer evaluation 
(mutual evaluation report) should be revised, making it comparable in the long run without 
preventing methodological improvements. International Organisations should study whether it is a 
necessary technical assistance to start a security sector reform before implementing an International 
Regime such as the AML/CFT. The policy makers should design a strategy to manage and map 
different levels of analysis (EU, National and Cross Borders); then they should think about 
determining the main information requirements of CFT stakeholders. This change of strategy would 
compel the international organisation to provide clear policy guidance to the private sector. 
 
There is a question of how much information law enforcement agencies should give to the regulated 
financial sector in order to maximise the efficiency of data collection, and thus contribute to 
keeping financial institutions informed of the new patterns, indicators and typologies relevant to 
fighting against Terrorist Financing. The complexity of Terrorist Financing requires a coordination 
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of public and private sectors, and law enforcement and intelligence agencies need to give advice to 
financial institutions and designated non financial businesses professions on what kind of data they 
need. 
 
An enhancement of public cooperation is also necessary. In the case of prosecutions, one of the 
largest challenges law enforcement faces is that of compiling evidence around a case of terrorism. 
There is a large amount of information that will never be seen in a courtroom because it cannot be 
verified. There is a conflict between collecting evidence for courts (law enforcement) and collecting 
information to inform a government (intelligence agencies). This conflict must be solved by an 
improved construction of a CFT strategy. Information exchange is another fundamental component 
of the CFT. There still remain legal barriers when two or more jurisdictions are involved and when 
gathering information in one country is a criminal offence if data privacy and bank secrecy laws 
remain in place. This poses many restrictions on which institutions can disclose data in their 
possession, eg, SWIFT. 
 
The current legal framework is not designed to deal efficiently with the CFT, because financial 
institutions must comply with five institutions, regulators, law enforcement agencies, internal 
management and employee conscience, and society. There still exist formal channels not disclosing 
information and resulting in inefficient and ineffective practices. All these points should be taken 
into account to genuinely deter FT. Nevertheless, the key that would make it all feasible is to 
overcome weak governance, for weak governance impedes the development of a domestic Regime 
on AML/CFT as well as the harmonisation of domestics Regimes, which is the real disease of the 
efficiency of international regulatory standards. 
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ANNEX I. Profile of the Overall Compliance of 46 Countries with FATF Recommendations 
FATF Recommendations Compliant(%)
Largely
Compliant
(%)
Partially
Compliant
(%)
Not 
Compliant 
(%) 
Missing 
Values 
(%) 
Assessed
Jurisdictions
in number
1.ML offence 6.5 47.8 43.5 2.2 0 46
2.ML offence-mental element 
and corporate liability 30.4 41.3 26.1 2.2 0 46
3.Confiscation and provisional 
measures 15.2 50.0 32.6 2.2 0 46
4.Secrecy laws consistent with 
the Recommendations 58.7 37.0 4.3 0 0 46
5.Customer due diligence 0 13.0 71.5 15.2 0 46
6.Politically exposed persons 0 19.6 26.1 54.3 0 46
7.Correspondent banking 10.9 21.7 17.4 50.0 0 46
8.New technologies & non 
face-to face business 17.4 19.6 34.8
  
28.3 0 46
9.Third parties and introducers 13.0 15.2 28.3 17.4 26.1 46
10.Record keeping 32.6 37.0 26.1 4.3 0 46
11.Unusual transactions 13,0 28.3 37.0 21.7 0 46
12.DNFBP- R.5,6,8-11 0 0 52,2 47.8 0 46
13.Suspicious transaction 
reporting 6.5 30.4 54.2 10.9 0 46
14. Protection no tipping-off 56.5 21.7 19.6 2.2 0 46
15.Internal controls, 
compliance& audit 6.5 39.1 47.8 6.5 0 46
16.DNFBP-R.13-15&21 0 6.5 50.0 43.5 0 46
17.Sanctions 0 37.0 54.3 8.7 0 46
18.Shell Banks 26.1 37.0 30.4 6.5 0 46
19.Other forms of reporting 58.7 17.4 8.7 15.2 0 46
20.Other NFBP & secure 
transaction techniques 43.5 19.6 10.9 23.9 2.2 46
21.Special attention for higher 
risk countries 15.2 21.7 32.6 30.4 0 46
22.Foreign branches & 
subsidiaries 8.7 30.4 30.4 26.1 4.3 46
23.Regulation, supervision and 
monitoring 0 30.4 60.9 8.7 0 46
24.DNFBP-
regulation,supervision and 
monitoring 
0 8.7 34.8 56.5 0 46
25.Guidelines& feedback 6.5 21.7 39.1 32.6 0 46
26.The FIU 6.5 52.2 26.1 15.2 0 46
27.Law enforcement authorities 30.4 37.0 26.1 6.5 0 46
28.Powers of competent 
authorities 65.2 21.7 13.0 0 0 46
29.Supervisors 15.2 41.3 39.1 4.3 0 46
30.Resources, integrity and 
training 2.2 43.5 45.7 8.7 0 46
31.National co-operation 15.2 43.5 34.8 6.5 0 46
32.Statitstics 0 28.3 47.8 23.9 0 46
33.Legal persons beneficial 
owners 10..9 19.6 50.0 19.6 0 46
34.Legal arrangements 
beneficial owners 10.9 13.0 21.7 13.0 41.3 46
35.Convention 8.7 45.7 45.7 0 0 46
36.Mutual Legal 
Assistance(MLA) 26.1 52.2 19.6 2.2 0 46
37.Dual criminality 45.7 34.8 15.2 4.3 0 46
38.MLA on confiscation and 
freezing 21.7 39.1 34.8 4.3 0 46
39.Extradition 45.7 39.1 6.5 8.7 0 46
40.Other forms of cooperation 2.2 4.3 2.2 91.3 0 46
Source: author’s calculations using data from mutual evaluations; Verdugo (2008a). 
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Annex II. Profile of the Overall Compliance with Nine Special Recommendations on Terrorist Financing 
Nine Special 
Recommendations 
Compliant
(%)
Largely
Compliant
(%)
Partially
Compliant
(%)
Not 
Compliant 
(%) 
Missing 
Values 
(%) 
Assessed
Jurisdictions
in number
SR.I. Implement UN Instruments 8.7 23.9 52.2 15.2 0 46
SR.II. Criminalise Terrorist 
Financing 8.7 32.6 37.0 21.7 0 46
SR.III. Freeze /confiscate terror 
ass 2.2 19.6 50 28.3 0 46
SR.IV. Suspicious transaction 
report 8.7 30.4 23.9 37.0 0 46
SR.V. International Cooperation 13.0 45.7 26.1 15.2 0 46
SV.V.I. Requirements for money 
transfer 15.2 32.6 34.8 15.2 2.2 46
SR.VII. Wire transfer rules 8.7 15.2 34.8 41.3 0 46
SR.VIII. Non-profit organisations 10.9 19.6 39.1 30.4 0 46
SR.IX. Bearer instruments 6.5 8.7 34.8 37.0 13.0 46
Source: Verdugo (2008a) 
 
Annex III. The Jurisdictions’ Overall Compliance Scores 
Cod Jurisdictions 
Overall
Compliance
AML/CFT Store
Cod Jurisdictions 
Overall
Compliance
AML/CFT
Store
ALB Albania 59 NPL Nepal 16
AUS Australia 77 NOR Norway 87
BHR Bahrain 75 PAN Panama 99
BLR Belarus 54 PRY Paraguay 55
BEL Belgium 109 PER Peru 93
BOL Bolivia 38 PRT Portugal 93
BRN Brunei 55 SAM Samoa 40
CHL Chile 73 SVK Slovakia 50
COL Colombia 80 SVN Slovenia 100
CYP Cyprus 105 ESP Spain 86
DNK Denmark 73 LKA Sri Lanka 41
DOM Dominican Republic 43 SDN Sudan 22
FJI Fiji 67 SWE Sweden 76
GIB Gibraltar 92 CHE Switzerland 88
HUN Hungary 112 SYR Syria 57
ISL Iceland 70 TUR Turkey 55
IND India 53 URY Uruguay 52
IRL Ireland 87 USA US 103
ITA Italy 92 VUT Vanuatu 49
JAM Jamaica 76 GRB UK 109
LVA Latvia 79 GRC Greece 49
LTU Lithuania 87 CHN China 68
MRT Mauritania 44 GEO Georgia 57
Source: Verdugo (2008a). 
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